Introduction: Interrogating Democracy in World Politcs by Hoover, J. et al.
Hoover, J., Sabaratnam, M. & Schouenborg, L. Introduction: Interrogating Democracy in World 
Politcs. In: J. Hoover, M. Sabaratnam & L. Schouenborg (Eds.), Interrogating Democracy in World 
Politics. (pp. 1-12). UK: Routledge. ISBN 9780415595315 
City Research Online
Original citation: Hoover, J., Sabaratnam, M. & Schouenborg, L. Introduction: Interrogating 
Democracy in World Politcs. In: J. Hoover, M. Sabaratnam & L. Schouenborg (Eds.), Interrogating 
Democracy in World Politics. (pp. 1-12). UK: Routledge. ISBN 9780415595315 
Permanent City Research Online URL: http://openaccess.city.ac.uk/12467/
 
Copyright & reuse
City University London has developed City Research Online so that its users may access the 
research outputs of City University London's staff. Copyright © and Moral Rights for this paper are 
retained by the individual author(s) and/ or other copyright holders.  All material in City Research 
Online is checked for eligibility for copyright before being made available in the live archive. URLs 
from City Research Online may be freely distributed and linked to from other web pages. 
Versions of research
The version in City Research Online may differ from the final published version. Users are advised 
to check the Permanent City Research Online URL above for the status of the paper.
Enquiries
If you have any enquiries about any aspect of City Research Online, or if you wish to make contact 
with the author(s) of this paper, please email the team at publications@city.ac.uk.
 1 
Introduction: Interrogating Democracy in World Politics 
 
Joe Hoover, Meera Sabaratnam and Laust Schouenborg 
 
5746 Words 
Democracy, as an ideal and a form of government, occupies a privileged position in 
world politics. In this collection, we aim to place both conventional understandings of 
democracy and its privilege under suspicion. This interrogation is important for 
understanding what democracy means beyond the nation-state and evaluating the 
historical narratives of progress that sustain these meanings. The goal of this 
introduction is to provide a framework for the multiple lines of questioning that are 
opened up in the chapters that follow. To do this we examine the privilege associated 
with democracy across multiple sites of world politics, drawing out three key 
assumptions. As we discuss these assumptions about democracy in world politics, we 
elaborate on the diverse ways that the contributions to this book challenge them. 
While the book is separated into historical and conceptual sections, reflecting 
different approaches to the topic, these different methods of interrogation share the 
goal of unsettling the assumptions supporting the privileged place of democracy in 
world politics – this provides a multi-dimensional critique that is radical but plural, 
revealing linkages, discrepancies and surprises, rather than leading to a single line of 
critique. 
 
In an earlier period of world politics, suspicion was cast upon the very idea that 
democracy was important in such matters – either in relation to domestic government 
or the structure of international politics. A historical shift is evident across a range of 
issues in world politics. The democratic peace theory has a central place in 
International Relations (IR)
1
, which gives democratic forms of government causal 
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force in preventing wars. This builds upon a long-standing line of thought that accords 
pacific and moral virtues to democratic government. Related to this has been the 
infusion of a commitment to democracy into practices of development assistance and 
state building, as well as the rise of a global apparatus of democracy promotion. These 
developments reflect not only the empirical claims regarding democracy’s relation to 
peace and prosperity, but also a wider commitment to the universal moral value of 
democracy. The human rights regime defends the civil and political rights that are the 
corner stone of the liberal democratic tradition, the discourse around the 
Responsibility to Protect (R2P) links sovereign legitimacy to a state’s accountability 
to its citizens, and the fight to develop global governance through an international rule 
of law depends upon the presumed universality of democracy as a political good. This 
moral commitment to democracy culminates in the ideas of global civil society and 
cosmopolitan politics, which seek to use democracy to reform the international order 
directly. While these developments do not form a cohesive program of thought, they 
do point to the privileged place democracy has in world politics.  
 
Determining exactly how and why democracy became such a central concept in world 
politics is probably impossible. Undoubtedly, it has to do with the political dominance 
of liberal democratic powers, which in turn established a liberal international order 
that has defined world politics in the last century and the early part of our current one 
(Ikenberry 2009). Interesting as these debates may or may not be, our central concern 
is with the assumptions that give the discursive victory of democracy such seeming 
stability. A large choir sings the praises of democracy, but the simple force of the 
melody cannot cover the dissonance and tension, which calls out for 
acknowledgement if not resolution. 
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The privilege of democracy is made possible both by the histories we construct of its 
development and the conventional meanings that define an essentially contested 
concept. For this reason, our interrogation of the privilege of democracy proceeds on 
both historical and conceptual lines. The first section of the book focuses on the 
historical development of democracy and contests familiar narratives of progressive 
reform, essential linkages to liberal capitalism, the desirability of a democratic 
international order and the necessity of the national state as the key site of democracy. 
What emerges is a more ambiguous history that undermines many assumptions. The 
second section focuses on the meaning of democracy and undoes the necessary ties 
made between national citizenship and democracy, questions the universal moral 
value of democracy, and reconfigures the linkages between democratic government 
and peaceful world politics. To organize the diverse interrogations presented here, 
which pursue contrasting lines of critique in different domains of world politics, we 
focus on three key assumptions upon which democracy’s privilege rests. First, we 
examine the assumption that democracy reduces violent conflict and supports peace 
and stability. Second, we question the belief in historical progress within societies that 
culminates in a liberal democratic capitalist state. Finally, we analyze the 
presumptions regarding democratic membership at various levels, looking to national 
citizens, cosmopolitan individuals and states as problematic democratic subjects.  
 
Violence and Stability 
Perhaps what has contributed the most to establishing democracy as a universal good 
in world politics has been the idea that it is associated with peace and stability. This is 
a tradition of thought going back, at least, to Paine and Kant, and the latter’s essay 
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Toward Perpetual Peace from 1795 (Kant 1983). It became a real force in world 
politics when American president, Woodrow Wilson, made it a central element of his 
foreign policy in the final stages of WWI - so much so that today the terms democracy 
promotion and Wilsonialism are often used interchangeably. However, if we look for 
the more recent causes of why the idea has risen to such prominence, it seems that the 
explanation is to be found in the work carried out by predominantly American IR 
scholars in the 1970s and 1980s on what came to be known as the ‘Democratic Peace 
Thesis’, namely the empirical proposition that democratic states do not go to war 
against each other. This research prompted Jack Levy to state in 1989 what had in 
effect become the consensus view in large parts of academia: that the ‘absence of war 
between democratic states comes as close as anything we have to an empirical law in 
international relations.’ (Levy 1989: 270)  
 
The year 1989 is important because it also signified the end of the Cold War, the start 
of an era of US dominance in world politics and - as we shall touch upon in the 
section on ‘Historical Progress’ below - the disappearance, in the view of some 
observers, of any systemic competitors to the liberal-capitalist-democratic way of life. 
The resulting material and ideological hegemony of the US was what allowed the first 
president Bush to proclaim a ‘New World Order,’ president Clinton to follow this lead 
with his national security strategy of ‘Engagement and Enlargement’ and the second 
president Bush to embark on a full-scale military campaign in the name of democracy 
(and the eradication of WMDs), ‘Iraqi Freedom,’ which had as its ultimate goal the 
democratisation of the entire Middle East, and perhaps, the world. As he expressed it 
in his state of the union address in 2003 in the run-up to the invasion: 
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Americans are a free people, who know that freedom is the right of every 
person and the future of every nation. The liberty we prize is not America's 
gift to the world, it is God's gift to humanity.  
(Bush 2003)    
 
Or as he put it to the troops at Bagram Air Base, Afghanistan, in 2006: 
 
History has taught us democracies don't war. Democracies -- you don't run for 
office in a democracy and say, please vote for me, I promise you war. 
(Laughter.) You run for office in democracies, and say, vote for me, I'll 
represent your interests; vote for me, I'll help your young girls go to school, or 
the health care you get improved [sic].  
(Bush, 2006) 
 
There are many different explanations in the academic literature for why democracies 
do not go to war – Bush’s assertion that it is due to the check placed on decision-
makers by the electorate, is only one of them.
2
 However, the quote above, and 
numerous statements by his predecessors, is testimony to the fact that the democratic 
peace idea had successfully transplanted itself from academia to the real world of 
international politics.  
 
Meanwhile, in the 1990s, and especially the 2000s, a number of academics started to 
question the idea of an unambiguous correlation between peace and democracy. In 
articles and a recent book, Edward D. Mansfield and Jack Snyder (1995, 2001 and 
2005) have studied the propensity of democratizing states to go to war, showing that 
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they are just as, if not more, belligerent as non-democracies. If there is such a thing as 
the democratic peace, it only exists between so-called mature democracies. Amy 
Chua (2003) has developed a similarly critical argument in her US national bestseller 
World on Fire. Her key thesis is that exporting free-market democracy to countries 
with a market-dominant minority consistently leads to ethnic violence, when the 
newly enfranchised majority elects to possess what they believe is rightfully theirs to 
take. Finally, Roland Paris (2004), in the book At War’s End, argues that prevailing 
peace-building strategies, based on comprehensive political and economic 
liberalization, need to be rethought because they simply do not produce the positive 
outcomes originally ascribed to them.     
 
However - and this is our key point - none of these authors question the fundamental 
value of democracy and whether it is intrinsically associated with peace and stability. 
Paris is especially clear on this: 
 
The purpose of this book, however, is not to reject the Wilsonian 
peacebuilding strategy in its entirety, but to expose the weaknesses of the 
naive version of Wilsonianism that informed the missions of the 1990s. 
Indeed, I shall argue that peacebuilders should preserve the broad goal of 
converting war-shattered states into liberal market democracies, because well-
established liberal market democracies tend to be peaceful in both their 
domestic affairs and their relations with other states. The challenge, however, 
is to devise methods of achieving this Wilsonian goal without endangering the 
very peace that the liberalization process is supposed to consolidate.  
(Paris 2004: 7) 
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Rather, what they do is to question elements of the process of transition to democracy 
and whether these are associated or not with stability. The assumption is still that 
democracy constitutes the ideal, and most peaceful, way of life - if it is properly 
realized. In Amy Chua’s words, ‘the best political hope for these countries lies in 
some form of democracy’ (Chua 2003: 263). This is not to give the impression that 
the contributions to this volume develop an anti-democratic programme, but to say 
that they do interrogate whether the idea of democracy is peaceful as such - both 
historically and conceptually. The result is a very different, and much more cautious, 
perspective on the presumed benefits of the democratic ideal.   
 
Nicholas Onuf and Peter Onuf spearhead this charge with a provocative essay on the 
emergence of modern international relations and the nation-state; exposing how both 
were partial expressions of the democratic principle, and their relationship to mass 
warfare. As they state at the start of the piece: 
 
Our purpose in this essay is to show how emerging ideas of democratic self-
government did not, and could not, lead to the republican millennium - a new 
epoch of peace and prosperity - that revolutionaries once anticipated and 
peace theorists still await. To the contrary, democratization enabled the 
governments of modern nation-states to expand the coercive capacity of 
states in pursuit of interests they defined as vital for their nations’ well-being. 
By doing so, democratization played an important part in unleashing ‘the 
dogs of war’. 
(Onuf and Onuf, this volume: [page]) 
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Ian Clark is less blunt in his chapter titled ‘Democracy in International Society.’ He 
does not tie democracy directly to conflict, but he does suggest that democracy’s 
manifestation in international society, in world politics, often appears as a form of 
exclusion when that society has traditionally been based on inclusion and pluralism. 
He traces this phenomenon through to contemporary proposals for establishing a 
league of democracies, enjoying special rights and duties, and the resistance to this, 
by states not sharing in these values. Chantal Mouffe brings this point home in her 
essay ‘Democracy in a Multipolar World,’ in which she argues that this exclusion – 
politics in its antagonistic form – is likely to lead to violent confrontation. As a 
remedy to this, she defends an agonistic approach to democratic politics that treats 
other cultures and ways of organizing political life as not intrinsically illegitimate. 
Her point is not that this will remove conflict, but merely that it will make it less 
likely and less uncompromising.    
 
In their respective contributions, Christopher Hobson and Sandra Halperin offer 
analyses of democracy’s relationship to liberalism and capitalism. Seeing that ‘liberal’ 
has almost become synonymous with ‘democratic’ in today’s world (note the quote by 
Bush above), Hobson’s argument, that most liberals in an earlier period of history 
were deeply suspicious of the democratic ideal, urges us to pause and reflect. Liberals 
tended to share in the general opinion that democracy was ‘a dangerous and unstable 
form of rule which inevitably led to anarchy or despotism’ (Hobson, this volume, 
[page]). Similarly, Halperin unsettles the orthodox narrative of how free-market 
capitalism and open societies are stepping-stones for the consolidation of democratic 
regimes. She reverses this causal link, and argues that it was in fact the mobilisation 
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of primarily working-people for WWI that led to democracy, embedded free-market 
economies and expanded political liberties. It was the threat of popular revolution that 
made the bourgeois classes compromise and give in to worker demands in these areas.  
 
Further developing the destabilising role of democracy, in their chapter, ‘Mobilising 
(Global) Democracy: A Political Reading of Mobility between Universal Rights and 
the Mob,’ Claudia Aradau and Jef Huysmans explore the democratic role of the 
mobile masses as agents of change that challenge established authority and structures. 
This challenge is not only domestic, as Halperin’s piece documents, but global. 
Aradau and Huysmans political reading of mobility challenges the internationalist and 
cosmopolitan aspirations for a formalized and stable democratic politics by 
recapturing the disruptive elements of democratic mass participation. 
 
Taken together, the contributions to this volume thus provide a much more 
comprehensive and multifaceted perspective on the value of democracy for peace and 
stability in world politics. They challenge one of the key arguments made for 
democracy promotion and interventionary politics in world politics, moving beyond 
the more limited focus on problems of transition that currently occupies much of the 
literature.  
 
History and Progress  
The ways in which we understand the history of democracy fundamentally shape how 
we understand both its present and its future, which seems obvious but is often 
ignored, despite the reality that our historical understandings strongly limit the 
political possibilities that are considered legitimate across a wide range of states and 
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other political communities today. The political force of these limits today is, in no 
small part, premised on the ideas both that it promotes peace and stability, as 
discussed above, and that it represents a historically advanced and stable form of 
government. Any critical interrogation of the meanings of democracy and democratic 
politics today must also interrogate and unsettle the dominant stories that are told 
about its emergence and apparent victories in the past. 
 
The rapid ascendance to international prominence of Fukuyama’s End of History 
thesis (1989) for example did not so much reflect a considered turn in the academy 
towards a neo-Hegelian theory of History and a Nietzschean reading of man’s 
nihilistic condition in modernity. More simply it told the History of democracy in a 
way that a particular and powerful post-Cold War audience in the United States 
wanted to hear, and consequently provided an intellectual justification for the 
resurgent liberal thinking and policy-making that were pursued through the 1990s and 
2000s that was expressed forcefully but conceptually ambiguous. Its central 
contention – that the marriage of capitalism, liberalism and democracy expressed in 
the State represented the end of man’s struggle for political recognition – was one 
eagerly seized upon, unsurprisingly, by supporters of American power to give their 
agenda momentum. What was startling and compelling about Fukuyama’s argument 
was not simply that it endorsed the stability and supremacy of the American form of 
political community, but that the elimination of alternatives was a property of the 
Historical process itself, giving it not a parochial but universal significance.  
 
Whilst it may have been the neoconservative movement that took with most alacrity 
to Fukuyama’s predictive claims and critique of political realism, a more minimalist 
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version of the claim that capitalism, liberalism and democracy were stable, 
historically self-reinforcing and normatively desirable had long been broadly accepted 
across the mainstream of Western academic literature on world politics. The argument 
that liberal democracy was ‘the only game in town’ was popular amongst even those 
that had reservations about the obvious desirability of this powerful consensus (Cox 
1998). The globalisation literature, both critical and supportive, that emerged from the 
early 1990s onwards also tended to view the growth of capitalism, liberalism and 
democracy as mutually reinforcing historical trajectories which were now, for various 
reasons accelerating and spreading at an exponential rate, as well as in ways which 
were making the territorial organisation of politics less primary in world politics 
(Scholte 2000).   
 
The presumed historical naturalness of the relationship between capitalism, political 
liberalism and democracy in particular had informed US and Western European 
foreign policies both during and after the Cold War, that worked on the assumption 
that democracy in the rest of the world would emerge and eventually be consolidated 
through the process of further political and economic liberalisation and integration 
into multilateral and capitalist international institutions, as had seemed to happen with 
Europe and Japan. After the end of the Cold War, it became even easier to implicate 
the specific attributes of liberal democracy with inclusion into global capitalism under 
the more general developmental, technical rubric of ‘good governance’ (Williams and 
Young, 1994), a principle which continues to animate many forms of co-operation 
and intervention with formerly colonised countries. 
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This strategy for democracy promotion considered elements such as performance 
legitimacy (Huntington 1996), the growth of a middle class (Inglehart and Welzel 
2005), and the socialization of elites as key factors in the emergence of democracy, all 
of which were compatible with the increasing influence of a market economy and 
liberal political values. For political scientists such as Huntington, the use of a liberal 
procedural version of democracy as the basis for analysis had the further benefit 
allowing for comparison and evaluation from afar. As Skinner (1973) argued with 
regard to Dahl, however, the result of naturalising a very particular view of 
democracy with a view to its observability and processual character was a necessarily 
conservative ideological move couched in the language of ‘neutral’ inquiry.  
 
It is against this background assumption of the naturalness of the relationship between 
capitalism, liberalism and democracy that apparent ‘puzzles’ in the study of world 
politics have emerged over the last two decades. Why did some states have only 
‘incomplete’ transitions to democracy? Why were there ‘reversals’ in 
democratisation? How can we account for the spread of illiberal democracies? How 
has China managed not to democratise given its economic liberalisation?  The 
structure of these questions reveals the deep way in which historical assumptions 
about the force and inevitability of this triadic relationship have dominated thinking 
about democracy. 
 
Alternative, dissident literatures on democracy arose however, particularly out of 
historical and sociological approaches to the question of democracy, consideration of 
which was for a long time excluded from the dominant paradigms which sought to 
understand world politics, despite the attempts of some to bring them into the study of 
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world politics (Halliday 1987; Rosenberg 2001). Core contributions to this included 
literatures on contentious politics (McAdam et al. 2001), structural violence and needs 
frustration (Galtung 1969; Burton 1990), and social conflict (Mann 1999). Whilst 
these mostly focused on the relationship between democracy, politics and violence as 
expressions of modernity, they also offered some intellectual resources and 
inspiration for re-thinking the assumed historical relationship between democracy, 
liberalism and capitalism within and between states, the task taken up by the 
contributors in this volume.  
 
In her chapter exploring the rise of democracy in two paradigmatic cases, Sassen 
argues that historically the industrialising classes, associated with the rise of the 
liberal rights-bearing subject of politics, pushed for the institutionalisation in law of a 
deeply unequal relationship between capital and labour, whereby the rights of capital 
to continue production systematically trumped claims made by workers for autonomy, 
better pay demands and working conditions.   The ongoing inequalities of power and 
opportunity within liberal democracies, where all citizens are formally equal, relate 
specifically to the efforts during the evolution of capitalist liberal democracy to 
protect capital. This put restrictions on the kind of democracy that could be envisaged 
both at the time and in the present day. This argument complements that of Halperin’s 
chapter, which argues that the aspects of mass participation in European democracies 
did not emerge as the gifts of a progressive liberalism, but rather were the somewhat 
inadvertent result of the working class being substantively mobilised for the purpose 
of industrial warfare and as a result improving their economic and political power.  
This created a platform from which various rights could be claimed. These chapters 
suggest that the assumption that the growth of capitalism and the ideal of the liberal 
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subject were historically drivers of democracy is a deeply flawed one; indeed, the 
message seems to be that capitalist economic structures and the rapid development of 
property rights suppressed or at least did not encourage full and equal participation in 
the democracies that eventually emerged.  This is a key argument particularly in terms 
of the contemporary attempts to link the promotion of capitalist growth automatically 
with the concept of democracy in ‘transition’ countries – the cautionary tale is that the 
concepts may well conflict, and indeed that the politics of emerging class interests 
condition the nature of the political settlement achieved in the name of democracy. 
 
Key to all of these chapters is the conviction that historically democracy has primarily 
implied struggle and the making of substantive claims for the redistribution of power 
and legitimacy in a political system. Onuf and Onuf argue, reading the events through 
Tocqueville, that the emergence of democracy in America was only contingently 
associated with constitutional politics and liberal restraints on government. Rather, it 
gathered its force from the imaginary of a democratic nation, which itself was created 
through the processes of Revolution and War. This made it a force that could be 
highly destructive when challenged and one not tempered by various anti-democratic 
constraints, as the Civil War demonstrated.   
 
The historical fear of being overwhelmed by the force of democratic struggle also 
comes across clearly in Hobson’s piece which historicises the concept of democracy, 
and in particular the various ways in which it was perceived to conflict with and 
threaten established values of liberalism. By re-focusing our historical gaze on the rise 
of democracy as an embedded form of political struggle that produces its own 
momentum and force, the idea that democratisation can be brought about through 
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mechanisms of internationally-sponsored good governance is brought into question. 
More fundamentally, the question is raised as to whether the dominant contemporary 
conceptions of ‘democracy’ that inform world politics – that is, the equation with 
contested periodic elections and the rule of law – ultimately neuter the historically 
radical political potential of democracy to challenge distributions of power and 
legitimacy through the struggle for substantive rights and recognition beyond those 
offered by liberal capitalism.  
 
Membership and the Democratic Subject 
Because membership in a democratic polity is in theory maximally inclusive, the 
question of membership in such political community is inherently controversial. By 
enabling claims to political power based on equal rather hierarchical status, 
democratic government generates social instability not as a simple historical fact, but 
as part of the inherent logic of the idea. For this reason discourses about stability and 
progress that surround our contemporary understanding of democracy are 
fundamental to its prestige. Yet, these assumptions also depend upon a further one, 
that the privileged subject of democracy, “the people”, is a coherent and identifiable 
political subject. Despite the invitation of universal participation, exclusions and 
limitations of membership undermine democratic openness, making it much easier for 
powerful political actors to take up the participatory mantle despite the persistence of 
hierarchy in the social order. 
 
Aristotle grasped this tension and his rejection of democracy reflects this; it was not 
enough to limit democratic membership to citizens (already an exclusive category), it 
was necessary that political power be limited to the most virtuous in an ideal state 
(Aristotle 1996: Books III and IV). Closer to our own time and reflecting an early 
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recognition of the linkage between domestic and international politics, Kant insisted 
that democratic participation be strictly limited by a rightful republican constitution 
and that each state be maintained as an independent body (Kant 1989). For Kant, the 
democratic subject was necessarily constrained by law and represented, rather than 
actually present, in political institutions. Yet, an important link was created between 
the people governed by a rightful constitution, as an expression of their rational 
autonomy, which in turn justified the independence of states, limiting republican 
government to the domestic sphere and making the international a distinct political 
space. In many ways this understanding of democratic membership and the political 
subjects of “the people” and “the state” are preserved today, as are Kant’s reliance 
upon claims regarding the pacific nature of democratic government progressively 
realised.  
 
The democratic citizen, as the individual rights-holder of liberal theory, bound in 
common cause with the nation, is assumed to be distinctly rational, opposed to 
wasteful and destructive wars, interested in prosperity and peace and able to hold the 
power of the state to account. Literature on the democratic peace is populated with 
such characters, assumed to be an adequate stand-in for actual citizens (Doyle 1986). 
Where membership in the nation is linked with less desirable results the democratic 
subject is seen as distracted and deluded by the forces of nationalism and ethnic 
identity, which prevent the realisation of democracy (Snyder 2000). Where deeper 
social ties of democratic politics are acknowledged, such that the character of the 
citizen is given context and history, national identity is tamed and made to serve the 
peace and prosperity promised by participatory government. The people become a 
social body linked by common cause, shared history and cultural identity and their 
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power an expression of a general will.
3
 This common identity is seen as vital to 
progress and development, as is exemplified again and again in literature on state 
building and development where ethnic, religious and tribal conflict undermines the 
democratic collective identity necessary to the modern nation-state, which is taken to 
be the proper end of political development, the final embodiment of moral and stable 
government. 
 
The democratic state in the international realm receives further privilege in liberal 
internationalist thought. Taking inspiration from Kant’s dreams of a perpetual peace, 
liberal thinking has assigned self-determination moral and political power, which 
gives virtuous and powerful democratic states distinct privilege in world politics 
(Ikenberry and Slaughter 2006). These liberal hopes gave birth first to the League of 
Nations, and then the United Nations – though in a conflicted form, as principles of 
sovereign equality sit uneasily with standards of legitimate government based on 
liberal democratic standards within the UN charter and through later developments. 
This democratic privilege justifies projects of intervention, development, state-
building and human rights protection, which in turn attempt to replicate democratic 
subjects – citizens, peoples and nation-states – bringing political life to a harmonious 
resolution within and without state boundaries. The recent debates over R2P bring this 
into focus as the document is claimed to add no new responsibility to the UN charter 
while also clearly making states responsible to their people. While the privilege 
accorded to liberal democratic powers and the faith of internationalists in the power of 
multilateral institutions is often critiqued, these criticisms are rarely articulated in 
terms the assumptions about democratic politics upon which they are based. 
Individual citizens are not actual parties to a contract, the people are never a given 
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social identity and the state is not unambiguously the only or best space for 
democracy – but to admit these facts puts the privilege accorded to “the people” 
within the state, as well as the “nation-state” as their representative, into question.  
 
Liberal cosmopolitans expose a tension in democratic thought by playing upon an 
important dissonance hidden in this harmonious score. If the individual’s moral rights 
justify democratic government, how is the exclusion of national democracy 
legitimate? Especially in our contemporary age when the forces that affect individuals 
extend beyond the confines of the national-state, it seems that democratic subjects and 
membership are evolving beyond nationalist and statist frames, or so cosmopolitans 
argue (Archibugi 2008). While cosmopolitanism remains a critical position, it has 
achieved a degree of dominance that warrants critical interrogation. This is all the 
more important because much cosmopolitan thinking depends upon questionable 
assumptions that there is a universal democratic subject, the rights bearing individual, 
who is located, ultimately, in the political community of humanity. Both the universal 
citizen and the community of humanity are contested ideas that are all too often 
overwhelmed by the chorus of democracy’s praises. David Held, in his chapter, 
reprises his influential defence of cosmopolitanism by challenging fundamental 
assumptions about the necessity of the state both in protecting individuals and 
enabling their political participation. While many of the chapters in this volume are 
critical of elements of Held’s position, they share common ground on contesting 
fundamental assumptions of citizens, peoples and nation-states.  
 
Chantal Mouffe provides a model for an alternative international politics, which has 
affinities with traditional pluralist international thinking but is a distinctive conclusion 
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that advocates an agonistic understanding of democracy in world politics – moving 
beyond mere tolerance of different internal orders within states, which essentially 
drains international politics of ethical content, she encourages an agonistic democratic 
political orientation based in mutual respect through contestation. Following a related 
line of questioning Onuf and Onuf charge the democratic revolutions of the 18
th
 and 
19
th
 centuries with fomenting a tempestuous and violent international politics caused 
by the inherent instability of democratic subjects. Citizenship, the people and the 
counters of the nation-state are ambiguous and open to change in a democracy and 
failing to recognize that volatility is a political risk. For this reason they are critical of 
cosmopolitan thinkers who attempt to expand democracy without acknowledging that 
popular politics are almost never the rational and moral affair cosmopolitans predict. 
Likewise, Sassen looks to the historical emergence of democratic citizenship to reveal 
the revolutionary tendencies of democratic participation. Her chapter traces the 
formation of the legal subject in early democracies, highlighting that the initial 
democratic subject is much more a liberal bourgeoisie subject – a property owner, 
whose rights to ownership and contract are vital protections – than an equal 
democratic subject. She illustrates this point by highlighting the way in which the 
labouring class was disadvantaged by the construction of legal subjects in early 
democratic states.  
 
Further, Aradau and Huysmans argue that the mobility of the masses, of the mob, was 
as important to the development of democracy as the establishment of a universal 
rights bearing subject. The mob not only provides one of the key bases for the 
development of democracy by disrupting the political order before it can be tamed 
and institutionalised as “the people” or “the nation”, but today the mobility of 
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democratic masses retains its political force. The illegal movement of migrants and 
their attempts to exert democratic rights undermine the idea that the nation-state is 
natural or constant. In his chapter, Daniel Bray also undermines the territorial 
assumptions of democratic politics, but without resorting to conventional 
cosmopolitan strategies that presuppose a universal form of political community 
based on one’s humanity. Instead, drawing on pragmatic philosophy, he points toward 
the development of democratic publics around particular issues and problems in world 
politics that either cannot be contained within state border or by their nature exceed 
them. He looks at the way global responses to environmental crises generate concrete 
sites of democratic politics that are not tied to either the territorial state or a national 
identity. Finally, David Chandler provides a troubling critique of cosmopolitan 
approaches to democracy. In his chapter he faults both liberal and poststructuralist 
forms of cosmopolitanism for severing the democratic subject from any site of 
politics. While it might be the case that the assumed universality of the rights bearing 
democratic subject is false and that the territorial state cannot effectively respond to 
social forces that shape contemporary life, the cosmopolitan response, Chandler 
suggests, is an evasion of the real question of what form and in what space will 
democratic politics take place if not within the sovereign state.  
 
Conclusion 
This critical project begins from the premise that ideas of democracy are not singular 
or simple, a prospect that does not sit comfortably with the contemporary role of 
democracy as a widely-spread political currency that is exchanged for the political 
legitimacy to intervene, authorise, rule, excuse and defer in its name. Collectively, the 
pieces in the volume seek to show that the place and role of democracy in world 
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politics is contingent, unstable and historically fragile, emerging through political 
struggle and disturbing the boundaries of world politics itself. As we have argued in 
this introduction, democracy and its emergence is both conceptually and historically 
associated with tumult and instability as well as peace, and has been suppressed by as 
well as survived alongside capitalism and liberalism, as its force and meaning have 
changed over time. Looking at the horizons of contemporary world politics, the new 
potential subjects of democracy – the agonistic mobs – emerge as simultaneously 
emancipatory and threatening in their demands, and the promises of progress and 
peace that were held out centuries ago look increasingly chimerical. Yet, it is this very 
instability and elusiveness that maintains democracy’s perennial promise – that it may 
yet renew itself as a dynamic discourse of empowerment for the many and not the 
few.  Through unsettling the ways in which power has appropriated the history and 
ideals of this agenda, we may yet be able to imagine alternatives. 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                
1
 We use the standard upper cases to denote the discipline as opposed to its subject matter. 
2
 Paradoxically, the war on terror was a key element in Bush’s successful reelection campaign, 
suggesting that sometimes you can in fact be elected on the ‘promise of war’.   
3
 A contemporary example of this line of thinking is found in Walzer (1983). 
